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Abstract
Using an incentivized experiment with statistical power, this paper explores the role of
stakes in charitable giving of lottery prizes, where subjects commit to donate a fraction of the
prize before they learn the outcome of the lottery. We study three stake levels: 5€ (n = 177),
100€ (n = 168), and 1,000€ (n = 171). Although the donations increase in absolute terms as
the stakes increase, subjects decrease the donated fraction of the pie. However, people still
share roughly 20% of 1,000€, an amount as high as the average monthly salary of people at
the age of our subjects. The number of people sharing 50% of the pie is remarkably stable
across stakes, but donating the the whole pie–the modal behavior in charity-donation exper-
iments–disappears with stakes. Such hyper-altruistic behavior thus seems to be an artifact
of the stakes typically employed in economic and psychological experiments. Our findings
point out that sharing with others is a prevalent human feature, but stakes are an important
determinant of sharing. Policies promoted via prosocial frames (e.g., stressing the effects of
mask-wearing or social distancing on others during the Covid-19 pandemic or environmen-
tally-friendly behaviors on future generations) may thus be miscalibrated if they disregard
the stakes at play.
Introduction
Generosity toward others and particularly sharing with those less fortunate are fundamental
features of most human societies and religions around the Globe [1–3]. Over 30 years of exper-
imental research across fields has documented that people are fairly generous in the lab and in
the field even toward unrelated others. Generosity is traditionally measured via the Dictator
Game (DG, henceforth), proposed by [4]. DG is a 2-player game, in which one player, a dicta-
tor, is asked to divide a certain amount of money between himself and another–normally
unknown and anonymous–recipient who can only accept the division. In general, dictators
donate an average of 30% of the money and only a minority keep the entire amount for them-
selves; when the recipient is a charity, the donations are even higher and more than 20% actu-
ally donate the whole pie (see [5, 6], for a meta-study). Although these numbers support the
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idea of “pro-social” human behavior, the vast majority of research has involved relatively low
stakes under certainty, where certainty refers to situations, in which subjects know the size of
the pie, the amount of money they keep, and the amount of money the recipients receive.
Notwithstanding this, many relevant real-life situations simulated by the employed experi-
mental protocols involve large degree of ambiguity and the stakes at play are considerable.
Under uncertainty, at least one aspect of the situation is not known with certainty. We term
risk uncertain settings, in which the probabilities are known, while ambiguity refers to situa-
tions where the probabilities of different events are unknown [7–9]. There is an agreement in
economics that ambiguity differs behaviorally from risk [9–13]. For example, donors to chari-
ties are rarely fully aware of how their money will be used and to what extent their goals will be
achieved; parents while sharing with/saving for their offspring cannot predict how their “gifts”
will affect their children’s life; physicians exert costly effort on their patients even though the
result of their work depends on a myriad of aspects out of their control; or the money inverted
in the prevention of climate change for future generations has largely unpredictable conse-
quences. Since all these and many other real-life acts of altruism toward others involve consid-
erable degree of ambiguity and large stakes, to what extent can we extrapolate experimentally
observed sharing behavior to real-life scenarios [14]? One particular puzzle while giving to
charities in experiments is the frequent donation of the whole pie [6]–labeled as hyper-altruism
throughout this study–that contrasts starkly with reality, where donating the whole income is
rather a rarity [15].
This study explores the impact of stakes on donations of lottery prizes to charities. We
argue that sharing, say, 5€ with a charity differs both morally and psychologically from sharing
1,000€ and hypothesize that large stakes might undermine altruistic motives.
We follow the literature and employ the DG. To study the role of stakes, we conduct three
treatments with respect to the pie to be shared: (i) 5€ (n = 177) mimicking a typical lab experi-
ment, (ii) 100€ (n = 168), and (iii) 1,000€ (n = 171). The few papers on the role of stakes on
giving behavior are quite inconclusive [6, 14]. The evidence ranges from strong negative effects
of stakes [16] through mild [17–19] and no effects [20] to positive effects in [21]. Since the
only study containing more than two stake levels is hypothetical [18] and the effects and exper-
imental protocols differ across studies, one cannot make general inferences about how stakes
affect generosity from the cited literature. Moreover, all the studies have been conducted
under certainty regarding all aspects of the donation task. In contrast, the donations are incen-
tivized and implemented in our experiments and we are interested in situations such as those
listed above, in which ambiguity prevails.
In our environment, people commit to donate a fraction of a lottery prize before they learn
whether they have won or not. Importantly, the subjects did not know the precise probabilities
of winning (see Methods). As a result, people donate under ambiguity. Similarly to stakes, the
evidence regarding how ambiguity affects giving is mixed. On the one hand, people may use
uncertainty–be it risk or ambiguity–strategically to share less without affecting their social
image, a phenomenon termed “moral wiggle room” [22]. [23] show that, in such contexts, self-
ishness appears more appropriate not only in the eyes of the decision-makers but also to oth-
ers. [24–28] support this idea if the donated quantity is risky or ambiguous. Nevertheless, the
effects are weaker and even disappear when the risk is either on the Dictators’ or both sides
[25, 27]. On the other hand [29], document that uncertainty does not always promote selfish-
ness. They contrast outcome uncertainty (uncertainty about whether the recipient is affected
or not) and impact uncertainty (uncertainty about how much the recipient is affected), report-
ing that donations actually increase under impact uncertainty. Therefore, the evidence sug-
gests that the extent of moral wiggling relies heavily on how uncertainty is introduced into the
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task. In particular, the asymmetry in the the impact of uncertainty across the donor and the
recipient seems to be a key element for observing self-serving narratives in giving behavior.
Since we are mainly interested in the effect of stakes, the ambiguity is symmetric in our
experiments in that both the kept and donated quantities are subject to the same degree of
ambiguity. We expect such symmetric ambiguity to exert at most a small positive effect on
donations because our manipulation makes the outcome uncertainty symmetric across both
the donors and the recipients but leaves room for impact uncertainty as the donors cannot
know how their donations affect the well-being of the recipients [29] and people cannot self-
impose ignorance regarding the payment to both parties asymmetrically [30]. To assess the
generalizability of our findings to certainty, we ran an additional treatment where people share
5€ under certainty. That is, they face a standard five-euro Dictator Game, in which all the pay-
ments were implemented with probability one (relegated to S1 File).
Since individual differences in generosity are essential for our understanding of the evolu-
tion and prevalence of cooperation [31] and another fundamental condition for extrapolating
experimentally-observed behaviors to real life requires a certain degree of stability of behavior
across contexts, we additionally ask whether the shares of a few particular behavioral types
decrease, remain, or increase as we increase the pie to be split. Recent evidence documents
that cooperative phenotypes are domain-general and temporally stable [32–34], suggesting
that we may observe little variation in the number of people adhering to different altruistic
types. We argue that the stakes at play are a fundamental element of the context and contribute
to this literature by analyzing stakes within the same setting, as opposed to different settings
under comparable stakes.
Methods
We performed a series of experiments at the University Loyola Andalucı́a, Spain. Subjects
were students enrolled in a series of courses across different fields of study and the two cam-
puses of the University. A total of 539 students agreed to participate. The experimenters
recruited the subjects for an experimental study to be conducted either in class or online (see
below), in which they could earn money. Each student was only allowed to participate in one
treatment. Students who participated first signed a written consent and then received the
instructions explaining the anonymity rules, the procedures, and compensation in the experi-
ment. Ethics Committee of the Universidad Loyola Andalucı́a approved the experiment and
all participants signed an informed consent.
We performed three main treatments. In each treatment, subjects were asked–among other
tasks–to donate to a charity of their choice or to an unknown charity (and not to other stu-
dents) any fraction of a prize to be won with unknown probabilities. Since the experiment was
performed in a jesuist University, the vast majority of subjects in the 5€ and 1,000€ treatments
chose to donate to the jesuist non-governmental organization Entreculturas; other charities
were also selected but rarely. All these donations were executed following the preferences of
the subjects. For the sake of simplicity, all the donations in the 100€ treatment–that was con-
ducted later–were made to an “unknown” charity and we transfered all the donations to
Entreculturas.
The difference across the three main treatments was the prize to be split: 5€, 100€, or 1,000
€. All subjects were informed that, during the experiment, they would have a chance to partici-
pate in a lottery, in which they can earn a fixed amount of money that varied across the treat-
ments and that was known to the subjects while making their donations. However, no subject
was informed about the likelihoods of earning these quantities etc. That is, they were entirely
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agnostic regarding the odds of earning the money. In the terminology of this study, the proba-
bilities of earning the 5€, 100€, or 1,000€ were ambiguous for the participants.
The sample sizes were predefined by statistical power. The sample is large enough to detect
an average effect of 0.3SD, with a power of 0.8 and a significance level of 95%. A total of 177
students participated in the treatment 5A (5€ under ambiguity) (mean age = 19.89, SD = 1.41)
of which 61.71% were females; 168 students participated in the 100A treatment (mean
age = 21.74, SD = 2.61) of which 56.54% were females; 171 students participated in the 1,000€
treatment (mean age = 19.70, SD = 0.99) of which 64.70% were females. Although the gender
composition is somehow imbalanced across treatments, the percentage of women does not sta-
tistically differ across the three treatments (p> 0.31). For Age we find that the 100A sample is
1.8 year older than 5A (p = 0.000) but no different than 1000A (p> 0.130). Importantly, we do
not find any effect of age nor gender on behavior (see also S1 File).
In all treatments, subjects were asked to donate a fraction of the prize from 0% to 100% in
10% increments. Subjects were fully aware of the commitment of their decisions and that they
were not allowed to change their choices after the resolution of the lottery.
There are two important elements of the design to consider. First, treatments 5A and
1,000A were conducted at the University premises in classrooms, while the 100A treatment
was run online due to the Covid-19 confinement during the very first week of the lock-down
in Spain. Note that the 100€ treatment, an intermediate step between the 5€ and 1,000€ treat-
ments, was planned to be conducted later but the pandemic situation obliged us to run it
online. Recent evidence suggests that the online data are valid and comparable to those gath-
ered in the lab [35–37]. The fact that the experiment was conducted during the confinement
might have an impact on the donations though, but [38] show that University students do not
change their giving behavior during the confinement. In [38], we show that behavior in the
DG changes during the first days of the home confinment in March 2020 in southern Spain
but this effect is only observed for non-student population above a certain age, while no behav-
ioral shift is documented for young adult students who are comparable to the subject pool ana-
lyzed in the 5€ and 1,000€ treatments. Second, subjects actually made two or three donation
decisions in the 5A and 1000A treatments, whereas they only made one decision in the 100A
treatment. To provide a clear comparison across treatments, we only use the first donation for
each subject.
Results
Fig 1 plots the average donation across treatments. In addition, Fig 2A plots the average
donated fraction of the pie in each treatment; Fig 2B and 2C focus on particular behavioral
types; Fig 2D plots the average donated share disaggregated by gender. Fig 3 displays the entire
distributions of relative giving in our three treatments (panels A, B and C) and reproduces the
distribution of donations to deserving recipients from Engel’s meta-analysis (panel D) [6]. To
provide an alternative comparison across stakes, Fig 4 in S1 File provides the cumulative distri-
butions of donated shares in each treatment.
Fig 1 shows that people give on average 2.40€, 26.19€, and 219.88€ (out of 5, 100, and 1000,
respectively). All these differences are statistically significant (5A vs 100A: p = 0.000; 5A vs
1000A: p = 0.000; 100A vs 1000A: p = 0.000). That is, the absolute quantity donated increases
dramatically across stakes. However, since the donations increase sublinearly with stakes, the
average donated share of the pie decreases, as illustrated in Fig 2A. More precisely, subjects
donate an average of 47.96% of the pie while sharing 5€. Nevertheless, the average fraction
decreases significantly for 100€ (26.19%; t-test: p< 0.0001) and 1,000€ (21.98%: t-test:
p< 0.0001). These differences are clearly visible in the distributions of donated shares in Fig 3,
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where the distributions in panels B and C (100 and 1,000€ treatments) are shifted to the left as
compared to panels A and D. Although people give relatively less out of 1,000€ than 100€, the
difference is not significant at conventional 5% (4.356; t-test: p = 0.124). We shall see below
Fig 1. Average giving in the 5€, 100€, and 1000€ treatments. Grey vertical lines represent standard errors of the
mean.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255668.g001
Fig 2. Additional behavioral patterns in the 5€, 100€, and 1000€ treatments. A. Average donated share of the pie. B. Shares of
particular altruistic types: Give0 correspond to people giving nothing; EqualSplit correspond to people giving one half of the pie;
GiveAll are people who donate all the money. C. Fractions of subjects donating less than 50% (Give< 50) or more than 50%
(Give> 50). D. Average giving by gender. Grey vertical lines represent standard errors of the mean.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255668.g002
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that this difference becomes significant once we control for age and gender. Hence, higher
stakes induce people to donate more to charities but the donated share decreases.
The effect of stakes notwithstanding, subjects still donate an average of 20% of the prize and
only about 20% donate zero even in the 1,000€ treatment, suggesting that only a minority
behaves selfishly even for stakes as high as the average monthly income of people aged below
25 in Spain [39].
In Fig 2B, we concentrate on three particular behavioural types for their relevance in the lit-
erature: selfish individuals who donate zero, people who share equally, and hyper-altruistic sub-
jects who give the whole pie to the charity. The only non-monotonic effect that we observe in
the data is the fraction of entirely selfish people (labeled as Give0 in Fig 2B). We document
20.90% of selfish subjects under 5€ and 18.12% under 1,000€ (being both figures similar to
Engel’s [6] meta-analysis, while this fraction increases to 34.94% for 100€. Whereas the differ-
ence between 5€ and 1000€ is not significant (t-test: p = 0.52), those between 5€ and 100€ and
between 100€ and 1,000€ are significant at 1% (t-tests: p< 0.01). We have no explanation for
this non-monotonicity but Fig 3 reveals that, if we compare the distributions in the 100€ and
1,000€ treatments, many people give zero or the minimum 10% in the former while the distri-
bution is more concentrated on 10% and 20% of the pie in the latter. In fact, giving 0 or 10%
are the most frequent gifts under 100€ (34.95% and 18.28%, respectively) in contrast to giving
10% and 20% (26.90% and 18.27%, respectively) under 1,000€. We would recover the monoto-
nicity if we aggregate the fractions of people giving less than 30% in the three treatments (not
reported, but see Fig 2C for a similar comparison).
The fraction of people sharing the pie equally (labeled as Equal Split) is largely stable across
treatments (t-test: p> 0.40), around 10% of the sample regardless the stakes (see Fig 2B).
In sharp contrast, the share of people who donate the whole amount (GiveAll) decreases
dramatically with stakes. Their fraction is similar for 5€ as compared to [6]. However the per-
centage of such hyper-altruistic subjects decreases significantly under both 100€ and 1,000€.
The differences with respect 5€ are statistically strong (t-test: p< 0.001) as is the difference
between 100€ and 1000€ (t-test: p = 0.008). In fact, such hyper-generosity virtually disappears
Fig 3. Distribution of donated shares across treatments (%). A. 5€. B. 100€. C. 1,000€. D. Donations to deserving
recipients in Engel’s meta-study [6].
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255668.g003
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under 1,000€: the percentage of subjects who donate the whole amount is only 2% and this
fraction is statistically indistinguishable from zero (t-test: p = 0.181).
To provide an alternative look at subjects’ types, we classify people according to whether
they give less or more than 50% in Fig 2C. The fraction of subjects giving less than 50%
(Give< 50) monotonically increases from 50% to 86% with the stakes (proportion tests:
p< 0.001 in all comparisons), whereas donating more than 50% (Give> 50) decreases steadily
from 37% to 4% (proportion tests: p< 0.001). These figures suggest that not only giving the
whole amount but also giving more than 50% is an artifact of the low stakes prevalent in the
experimental literature.
Since there has been some debate regarding whether women are more generous than men
[40–42] and whether each gender reacts differently to treatment manipulations [43], Fig 2D
disaggregates the behavior by gender. We find neither gender differences within treatments
nor differential treatment effects (t-tests: p> 0.1 for all comparisons). S1 File shows that these
conclusions are robust to employing regression analysis.
Table 1 provides a more rigorous statistical analysis of the findings using ordinary least
squares (OLS) regressions. Since the donations are bounded and the donated shares bounded
and discrete percentages in the experiment, Table 3 in S1 File additionally delivers the corre-
sponding tobit regression for the donated quantity and both the tobit and ordered logit regres-
sions for the donated shares; the same table also provides probit estimations for the models in
columns (3)–(7) in Table 1 where the dependent variables are binary. Since the results are
robust to the estimated model, we focus on the OLS regression from Table 1 in the main text.
All the regressions in Table 1 (as well as Table 3 in S1 File) have the same structure: we regress
a variable of interest on the treatment dummies and control for age and gender; the baseline is
the 5€ treatment in all cases.
Columns (1–2) corroborate that people donate more in absolute terms but less in relative
terms in both the 100€ and 1,000€ treatments, as compared to the 5€ case (p< 0.0001 in all
cases). In addition, the estimated coefficient of the donated share in the 1,000€ treatment is
Table 1. OLS estimation of the treatments effects.
(1) Giving (2) Share (3) Give0 (4) EqualSplit (5) GiveAll (6) Give < 50 (7) Give > 50
100€ 31.024��� -18.955��� 0.111�� 0.024 -0.225��� 0.180��� -0.204���
(5.430) (4.559) (0.053) (0.041) (0.048) (0.060) (0.053)
1000€ 217.194��� -26.815��� -0.014 -0.021 -0.303��� 0.348��� -0.327���
(15.930) (3.438) (0.042) (0.033) (0.037) (0.046) (0.040)
female 9.831 0.922 -0.073� 0.027 -0.021 0.004 -0.031
(11.094) (2.983) (0.040) (0.028) (0.031) (0.039) (0.033)
age -3.633 -1.787 0.010 0.000 -0.007 0.020 -0.020
(2.562) (1.149) (0.014) (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.013)
Constant 68.601��� 83.486��� 0.045 0.095 0.470�� 0.112 0.792���
(52.640) (23.320) (0.281) (0.193) (0.229) (0.300) (0.273)
Observations 513 513 513 513 513 513 513
R-squared 0.397 0.125 0.034 0.005 0.136 0.102 0.136
F test model 69.933 16.012 4.197 0.602 17.110 14.651 17.572
Note: Giving is the amount (in euros) and share is the percentage of the pie given in the Dictator Game (DG). Give0 = 1 if a subject gives 0 in the DG and 0 otherwise.
EqualSplit, GiveAll, Give< 50 and Give> 50 are defined in the same way. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
��� p< 0.01,
�� p < 0.05,
� p < 0.1.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0255668.t001
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41% lower than under 100€, a difference significant at conventional 5% (Wald test, p = 0.04)
for relative giving and strongly significant (p = 0.000) for absolute giving. Hence, pooling all
the data from all treatments into one model and controlling for treatment differences, age, and
gender simultaneously reveals that the sharing behavior is also different between the 100€ and
1,000€ treatments.
Column (3) analyzes how the proportion of selfish individuals differs across treatments. In
line with the above findings, only the 100€ treatment generates more entirely selfish individu-
als (p = 0.04). As for people sharing the pie equally, column (4) corroborates that they do not
differ across treatments. In contrast, column (5) confirms that higher stakes reduce the pro-
portion of hyper-altruistic subjects compared to the 5€ treatment (p< 0.0001 in both cases)
and between the 100€ and 1000€ treatments (Wald test: p< 0.0001). Finally, columns (6) and
(7) show that the effect of stakes on the fraction of people giving less than 50% (Give< 50) and
highly generous subjects (Give> 50), respectively, is in line with the findings discussed above:
higher stakes lead to lower donated share. The fact that the sums of the treatment coefficients
between columns (6) and (7) are statistically indistinguishable from zero (Chow tests,
p> 0.50) further suggests that equal sharing is stable across treatments and that people who
share more than 50% under low stakes might potentially switch to giving less than 50% under
high stakes. Our between-subject design does not allow to test this statement formally though.
All the reported results are robust to interacting the treatment effects with a female dummy
(see Table 2 in S1 File).
To test the generalizability of our findings to certainty, we ran an additional treatment, in
which people share 5€ under certainty. That is, they face a standard five-euro Dictator Game
and their decisions were implemented with probability one. As hypothesized above, we find a
mild positive effect of symmetric ambiguity on giving as compared to such control treatment.
More precisely, subjects donations are reduced by 11.46% under certainty (t − test = 2.04,
p = 0.043; see S1 File for more details). Since the difference is only significant at 5%, we make
two conclusions. First, our results contrast the unconditional claims that people exploit uncer-
tainty to hide their selfishness and one of our contributions is to point out that the effect of
uncertainty on moral wiggling is limited: moral wiggles disappear under the symmetric ambi-
guity employed in our study. Second, the small difference between the certainty and symmetric
ambiguity makes us believe that the documented role of stakes might be generalized to cer-
tainty under the assumption that stakes affect donations equally under both certainty and sym-
metric ambiguity. Future research should answer whether this assumption holds.
Conclusion
Using an incentivized experiment with statistical power, this paper analyzes how stakes affect
giving to charity. We show that, although the donations increases absolutely, the donated
shares are dramatically reduced as the stakes increase. Hence, our results support the findings
of [16] but contrast those of mild, null, or positive effects documented elsewhere [17–21]. It is
worth stressing that the two common features of both [16] and our study is the employment of
stakes as high as monthly salaries. The difference is that their experimental subjects were from
Bangladesh, a considerably poor society, while ours come from a developed country.
As for different behavioral types, we show that fair behavior–namely, sharing equally–is
remarkably stable across stakes. In contrast, both giving more than 50% and giving the whole
amount to charity virtually vanish as we increase the stakes. Hence, such hyper-altruistic
behavior observed in the experimental literature seems to be an artifact of low stakes typically
employed in psychological and economic experiments.
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Our findings have implications for scholars, policy-makers, and fundraisers. As for the scien-
tific contribution, we first show that sharing with others is a prevalent aspect of human nature
because people still share considerably (over 20%) in our experiment even for stakes as high as
an average monthly salary of young people at the same age as our experimental subjects [39].
On the other hand, since the degree of generosity is highly sensitive in both absolute and
relative terms on stakes, our second message is that theoretical modeling and simulating of
models of human altruism and cooperation should carefully account for how these phenom-
ena depend on the stakes of the modeled environment. We suggest that modeling generosity
in, say, typically day-to-day interactions may be subject to a higher degree of prosociality than
behavior of brokers in the stock market, where the stakes at play are considerably higher. Data
as ours might provide a guidance in this respect.
Third, we contradict the conclusions that cooperative and behavioral types are universally
stable. The literature has focused on different strategic settings [32–34], while we analyze vary-
ing stakes within the same setting. Nevertheless, stakes are a fundamental aspect of the context.
As a result, the definition of the different behavioral phenotypes should account for how each
type depends on the underlying incentives, as already suggested elsewhere (e.g. [14]).
Last, we only partially understand the underlying mechanisms behind the excuse-driven
behavior under uncertainty [22, 30]. Do people exploit uncertainty as an excuse to share less
with other generally or are there limits to such moral wiggling? Are moral wiggles under uncer-
tainty a moral or cognitive phenomenon? Since people give slightly more under symmetric
uncertainty as compared to certainty in our experiment, our data suggest that the role of uncer-
tainty as a source of moral wiggling is limited and relies on the asymmetry across the donor and
the recipient. If we remove such asymmetry, only impact uncertain remains and we reproduce
the results of [29]. Hence, the role of uncertainty as a trigger of moral wiggles is not unlimited.
Policy-makers appealing to concerns toward others should predict correctly how their rec-
ommendations depend on the contextual incentives. For example, many anti-Covid-19 poli-
cies, such as mask-wearing or social distancing, appeal strongly to the effects of one’s behavior
on others. Our data suggest that these policies might be ineffective if the policy-makers esti-
mate the effects based on social concerns measured under standard laboratory experiments.
These considerations naturally apply to other policies such as the enhancement of environ-
mentally friendly behaviors, charity giving, and so forth.
Regarding fundraising, our study informs the design of certain fundraising campaigns. For
instance, if one has a fixed amount of money to distribute via ruffles to the public and expects
a share to be donated to charities, more money would be collected if there were more small
prizes for many people than one unique high prize for one winner. If, in contrast, the fund-
raiser can choose whether to raise funds from the same number of people of differing
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